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abide with me; fast falls the eventide; 
the darkness deepens; lord, with me abide; 
swift to its close ebbs out life’s little day; 
earth’s joys grow dim, its glories pass away; 
change and decay in all around I see – 
o thou who changest not, abide with me. 
I need thy presence every passing hour; 
Where is death’s sting? Where, grave, thy victory? 
I triumph still, if thou abide with me. 
(H.F. Lyte 1793–1847)
Process Ontology
In this paper I will ask whether the religious hope of surviving one’s natural death can be expressed 
and at least partially explicated within the framework of a process ontology. the central idea of 
process  ontology  is  the  critique  of  the  notion  of  “substance”.  This  notion  seems,  however, 
indispensable if it is to be really me, the identical person, which has survived death. It is the very 
definition of a substance to be that which endures through time. But how can the subject survive 
death if it is not a substance? 
The relationship between process ontology and the notion of immortality has mostly been debated 
within the framework of Whiteheadian process theology. Whitehead’s notion of God played a key 
role in this debate. Because God does – in his “consequent nature” – preserve all contingent events 
of creation, several options were available to think even of subjective phenomenal experience as 
forever maintained in God.1 In what follows, however, the relationship of process ontology and the 
hope for resurrection will be analyzed independently of the problematic Whiteheadian notion of 
God. No simple “re-enactment” of Whitehead’s philosophy is intended, rather a transformation with 
some “creative novelty”. The main focus will be on establishing connections between themes of 
current  analytic  metaphysics  and  traditional  Whiteheadian  process  ontology,  ranging  from  the 
identity of particulars through time, the mind-body problem, and the metaphysics of time, to the 
reality  of  abstract  objects.  The  theory  sketched  here  uses  Whiteheadian  ideas  in  some crucial 
aspects, but places them within the debate of contemporary metaphysics. Most process philosophers 
are realists about processes and idealists about substances.2 Process ontology assumes processes 
with  a  mind-independent  unity  and  identity.  Some  of  these  are  directly  given  in  experience. 
1 For a detailed survey of these theories see Tobias Müller, Gott, Welt, Kreativität. Eine Analyse der Philosophie A.N.  
Whiteheads (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2009), pp. 269–94. 
2 See Nicholas Rescher, Process Metaphysics. An Introduction to Process Philosophy (New York: SUNY Press, 
1996), pp. 58f. 
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Substances, however, are theoretical constructs which are not directly given in experience, but are 
rather  the result  of  an abstraction.  It  is  this  central  thought  of  process  philosophy that  will  be 
exploited here in order to find middle ground in the metaphysical debate between endurantists and 
perdurantists.
The Problem of Becoming: Metaphysics between Heraclitus and Parmenides
In  his  magnum  opus  “Process  and  reality”  Whitehead  criticizes  modern  metaphysics  for  not 
adequately representing the riches of human experience.3 This charge is often made against analytic 
philosophy, arguably the liveliest  field in contemporary metaphysics.  In “utterances of religious 
aspiration”4 Whitehead saw a particularly fruitful source of human experience that  ought  to  be 
discussed in metaphysics. Can analytic metaphysics adequately conceptualize these “utterances of 
religious aspiration”? This is the question that will be pursued here by focusing on an aspiration 
most central to christianity, the hope for survival. Whitehead presents a surprising interpretation for 
the biblical verse “abide with me; fast falls the eventide” (Luke 24:29) that has found a “wealth of 
expression” in the first two lines of a famous hymn.5
Here the first line expresses the permanence, “abide”, “me”, and the “Being” addressed; and the 
second line sets these permanences amid the inescapable flux. Here at length we find formulated the 
complete problem of metaphysics. Those philosophers who start with the first line have given us the 
metaphysics of “substance”; and those who start with the second line have developed a metaphysics 
of “flux”. But, in truth, the two lines cannot be torn apart in this way. 6 The remark “in truth, the two 
lines cannot be torn apart in this way” expresses in a nutshell the theoretical framework of this 
paper. The technical expression “3.5-dimensionalism” refers to the attempt to keep these two lines 
together.  The goal  will  be to  find a  middle ground between the extremes of absolute  flux and 
changeless invariance through time. In analytic metaphysics these opposing positions are labeled 
“perdurantism” (the “4d-view”) and “endurantism” (the “3d-view”). According to the 3d-account, 
concrete enduring particulars like animals have spatial but no temporal parts. They are extended in 
space but not in time. If, say, you meet a human being you meet this entire person, not a temporal 
part  of  her  at  that  specific  point  in  time.  This  is  the view of  classic  substance  metaphysics.  a 
substance that endures through time undergoes only accidental change. It endures as a numerically 
identical entity through time. In contrast,  perdurance is a continuity of temporal parts in which 
certain structural similarities are preserved. By adding time as the fourth dimension, the perdurantist 
claims that concrete particulars have temporal parts. One never encounters an object in its entirety; 
rather one is in contact with one of its time-slices. The concrete particular is thus not an enduring 
substance but a four-dimensional space-time worm which comprises all  temporal stages of this 
individual (the “worm-view”). Or it is claimed that the concrete particular is not even this thing 
extended in space and time, but collapses ultimately into a mere sequence of causally connected 
stages  without  assuming  any  genuine  unity  (the  “stage-view”).  In  both  cases  the  traditional 
substance  view  has  been  abandoned.  The  idea  of  substances  has  been  challenged  by  many 
contemporary  philosophers.  The  worldview  advocated  by  the  sciences,  especially  relativistic 
physics, was clearly in favor of a four-dimensional account (the “block universe”). Given these 
developments, the relevance of the recent debate on resurrection in analytic metaphysics becomes 
3 Alfred N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, corr. edn (New York: The Free Press, 1978). 
4 Whitehead, Process, p. 208. 
5 He refers to the hymn by Henry Lyte. There is some evidence that Lyte wrote it in 1820 after visiting a dying friend, 
who, on his deathbed, kept murmuring the passage from Luke: “Abide with me; fast falls the eventide”. 
6 Whitehead, Process, p. 209. 
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obvious. One important contribution of this debate was the development of models of survival that 
are  compatible  with a 4d-view of  human persons.  This  is  true in  particular  for  those positions 
which, due to their physicalist assumptions, have to focus on bodily resurrection.7
The Internal Coherence of a Process 
It  is  widely assumed that  the  human body is  a  sequence  of  non-identical  physical  stages.  For 
something to count as one human body through time, all there has to be is the right kind of relation 
between those stages: immanent causation. This notion was already in use by the christian process 
metaphysician Borden Browne. He was influenced by Hermann Lotze and his critique of the notion 
of a substance was tightly integrated with his concept of immanent causation.8 The general idea is 
that a stage s1 of a given concrete entity e causes a later stage s2 of e. The question that arises 
immediately is how e can be construed as a persisting entity without assuming a non-changing 3d-
substance. Without assuming such a 3d-substance there is no numerical identity through time for 
concrete entities like human persons. The mere repetition of the relevant properties (stable pattern) 
together with the right kind of causal connection establishes, however, a weaker form of identity 
which is often called “genidentity”.9 On this view, what we commonly regard as a single entity is 
strictly  speaking  a  temporal  series  of  different  entities.  Because  these  entities  produce  their 
successor  causally  while  maintaining  key properties,  they can  be  considered  “identical”  in  the 
weaker sense of genidentity. 
This accords with Whitehead’s view. For him a concrete entity, even a person, consists ultimately of 
a  sequence  of  (psycho-physical)  events  which  produce  each  other  causally  while  maintaining 
certain key properties. What we commonly see as an enduring 3d-substance is really a “society” of 
events ordered serially in time and thus a process. For Whitehead, an entity which endures through 
time is characterized by two features: a common element of form and a genetic relatedness that 
orders the events serially.10 There is a causal inheritance of the defining characteristics in the causal 
series. These enduring patterns, the form, is not sufficient for the individuation of the entity. If this 
were the case, all events that instantiated the same abstract form would be identical.11 There remains 
the possibility of special forms whose instantiation generates individuals, a theory along the lines of 
aristotelian natural kinds.12 The idea of fixed, clearly and non-vaguely delineated natural kinds is 
according  to  most  process  philosophers  incompatible  with  the  theory  of  evolution.  Within  the 
context of survival of one’s natural death, the question arises whether or not a surviving human 
7 I have analyzed this development in Godehard Brüntrup, “Soul, Body and Survival. The Renaissance of Christian 
Materialism”, Revista Portugesa de Filosofia, 65 (2009): suppl., pp. 317–35. 
8 Borden Bowne, Metaphysics: A Study in First Principles (New York: Harper, 1882): “A change between things must 
depend on a change in things. Now when we remember that the only reason for positing things is to provide some 
ground for activity and change, it is plain that the changeless core is of no use and must be dropped as both useless 
and unprovable” (p. 51). 
“Interaction cannot be conceived as a transitive causality playing between things; it is rather an immanent causality 
in a fundamental unitary being” (ibid., p. 83). 
For the most recent developments see Zimmerman, “Immanent Causation”, Nous 31, Supplement: Philosophical  
Perspectives 11: Mind, Causation, and World (1997): pp. 433-71.
9 The concept “genidentity” was originally developed in Kurt Levin, Der Begriff der Genese in Physik, Biologie und 
Entwicklungsgeschichte. Eine Untersuchung zur vergleichenden Wissenschaftslehre (Berlin: Springer, 1922). 
10 Whitehead, Process, p. 34. 
11 I am not pursuing the interesting idea of individual essences here. It seems hard to square with the basic intuitions of 
process philosophy, where the individual event is not fully determined by any pre-existing essence. 
12 I am thinking of something like Michael Loux, Metaphysics. A Contemporary Introduction, 3rd edn (New York: 
Routledge, 2006). 
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being  can  remain  a  member  of  the  biological  species  homo  sapiens.  The  basic  entities  in 
(Whiteheadian) process ontology are individuated by their own unique perspective on the world as a 
whole, not by instantiating a particular form. 
Can 3D-Objects Emerge from 4D-Structures? 
It could be argued that an individual as a 3d-object somehow emerges from the repetition of similar 
events. But even if a stable pattern somehow emerges in this way, it is by no means implied that this 
pattern is a new 3d-entity without temporal parts. In process metaphysics, objects enduring in time 
are, to use a term of Rescher’s, “stability waves in a sea of process”13, patterns of activity that 
emerge from a base that is in constant flux. It is much more natural to view these stability patterns 
as higher-level processes than to construe them as entities without temporal parts. 
The thesis that genuine 3d-entities could somehow emerge from a 4d-base is not the thesis of 3.5-
dimensionalism at  issue here,  but  rather  the thesis  that  both the 3d-  and 4d-views are true on 
different  ontological  levels.  But  does  this  idea  really  make  sense?  If  an  entity  that  were  truly 
numerically identical through time (that is, without having temporal parts) could emerge from a 
constant flux of non-identical entities, we would have a mysterious and unintelligible emergence. 
We might as well imagine the emergence of a concrete entity like a tree from a configuration of  
abstract entities like prime numbers. Such a claim is not really intelligible. A true process ontology 
can introduce enduring 3d-entities only at  the price of incoherence.  The same argument can be 
made  against  the  idea  that  the  higher-level  3d-substances  are  somehow  constituted  by  the 
underlying series of non-identical events. Constitution theory has recently been made popular by 
Baker and others.14 It builds on the old Aristotelian notion that a bronze statue coincides with a 
lump of bronze by being at the same location in space and time, while not being identical to that  
lump. can process ontology make use of this idea? Could an enduring 3d-entity without temporal 
parts  coincide  with  individual  events  in  a  series  without  being identical  to  them? That  sounds 
initially promising. But constitution theory is not substance dualism. The enduring 3d-entity cannot 
be ontologically independent  and then miraculously interact  with the underlying events.  If  that 
cannot be the case, then we get back to the idea that enduring 3d-entities somehow “emerge” from 
an underlying process that is just a series of non-identical events. The intelligibility of this idea has 
already been questioned. 
The most basic individuals in process metaphysics are then only the momentary events. If each of 
these  events  is  causally  connected  to  the  following  event  in  the  sequence,  then  the  talk  of  a 
temporally enduring object can be justified, but only in the sense of genidentity, not that of strict 
numerical identity. In this context Whitehead often uses “vibration” and “rhythm” as metaphor. An 
enduring object15 gains its inner determinations by the rhythmic process of inheriting properties 
from its predecessors and by its own creative novelty. This stable rhythmic pattern of its history 
constitutes the enduring object, which is not a 3d-object but a higher-level process. Whitehead knew 
that this account was in full accordance with contemporary science. A stable resonance or vibration 
in a quantum field may constitute what we call a particle. This particle does not exist as a 3d-
substance  without  temporal  parts.  It  is,  however,  the  appropriate  connection,  the  “thread  of 
persistence”,16 and thus the stability of the pattern, and thus the genidentity of the underlying events, 
13 Rescher, p. 53. 
14 Lynne Rudder Baker, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
15 Whitehead, Process, p. 279. 
16 Peter Simons, “The Thread of Persistence”, Ch. Kanzian (ed.), Persistence (Heusenstamm: ontos, 2008), pp. 165-84. 
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that justify the talk of a particle enduring in time. 
In what follows, a process ontology of the kind just outlined will be assumed without much further 
argument. It is the backdrop for the main argument of this paper. What will be shown, however, is 
why the account developed here differs from traditional worm or stage 4d-views. The aim of the 
3.5d-view  is  to  locate  a  middle  ground  between  the  “abide  with  me”  and  the  “fast  falls  the 
eventide”. Before we can get to this, a few more topics need to be covered at least very briefly 
because they are central to understanding a process ontology in a broadly Whiteheadian tradition: 
the metaphysics of time, the mind-body problem, and the metaphysics of abstract objects. All of this 
will be done only insofar as it serves to answer the question whether the idea of surviving one’s  
natural  death  can  be  made  intelligible  within  an  ontological  framework  that  wants  to  manage 
without the notion of enduring 3d-substances. This seems to make survival impossible, not only in 
the world to come but already in this world. If I am a series of momentary psycho-physical events 
then  I  do,  in  a  certain  sense  at  least,  die  even  now at  each  passing  moment.  That  is  a  very 
provocative thought. It makes death lose is unique status. This idea of radical becoming only makes 
sense in a presentist conception of time.
Presentism
Presentism is the common-sense and intuitive view of time. Only the present exists; the future does 
not  yet  exist,  and the past  no longer  exists.  The past seems to exist  in  a  certain way,  because 
statements about the past are commonly regarded as semantically bivalent (either and only true or 
false).  What  makes  them true  or  false  if  the  past  no  longer  exists?  In  the  current  debate  the 
presentist view has been on the defensive due to a criticism which David Lewis has formulated in  
an exemplary fashion.17 Lewis denies that the only intrinsic properties of an object are those it has at 
the present  moment.  By intrinsic  properties I  mean those that  a  thing has  independently of its 
relations to other objects. Assume that Peter is now blind but could still see ten years earlier. The 
same person cannot be blind and sighted. The natural solution to this problem is to relate those 
properties to a point in time. A person can be “seeing-at-t1” and “blind-at-t2”. But then we are no 
longer dealing with intrinsic properties, because we have defined them in relation to a point in time. 
Thus, for Lewis the only sensible solution is to construe persons as 4d-objects. The metaphysics of 
time that is most consistent with this view is the eternalist picture. In the same way as no spatial 
point has a special status, no point in time (here, the present) has a special status. the common-sense 
triad of past, present, and future (the A-series) is replaced by the duality of earlier and later (the B-
series). A central problem of this picture is that it does not leave room for contingent facts. An entity 
has its properties necessarily,  because there is no open future with alternative possibilities. This 
view is certainly at odds with both our common-sense view and Christian tradition as it is usually 
understood. Thus, even though the account proposed here is at the most fundamental level a 4d-
view, it nevertheless supports a presentist conception of time which is usually associated with a 3d-
view. This requires a version of the stage-view, as opposed to the worm-view, where the stages are 
very brief.  This  move,  though somewhat  surprising in  the contemporary debate,  is  nonetheless 
characteristic of a process ontology of radical becoming.18 The philosophical motivation for this lies 
in the attempt to take our temporal existence seriously, to be a “serious tenser”. Not only do we 
17 David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 202f. 
18 In the current debate, Galen Strawson has advocated a similar view and claimed that the “Persistence Belief is not 
experientially natural.” see Galen Strawson, Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p. 221. 
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regard the future as non-existent, but we experience the past as something which no longer exists. 
But what about the critical questions concerning presentism? The first is: what makes sentences 
about the past true or false? This question can easily lead to erroneous ontological claims. If we 
claim, say, that there once were people that do not exist today, does this imply that the people of the  
past  still  somehow exist?  No,  it  only implies  that  some people,  who do not  exist  today,  were 
existing in the past. To have existed in the past is not the same as never having existed, but it does 
not imply actual present existence. A second and more difficult question seems to be the one raised 
by Lewis. Can the only intrinsic properties of a person be the ones the person has here and now? 
Lewis answered in the negative,  but in what follows I  will,  in a certain sense, offer a positive 
answer. But before we can get to this, our sketch of a process metaphysics will have to be fleshed 
out further by some remarks on the mind-body problem. 
Pan(-proto-)psychism 
Process ontology as such is neutral with regard to different positions in the mind-body debate. A 
dualism of mental and physical processes could be assumed just as easily as a monism of merely 
physical processes. A broadly Whiteheadian process ontology needs mental properties to secure the 
connection  of  events  that  happen  sequentially  in  time.  For  Whitehead,  causation  is  a  “simple 
physical feeling”.19 Each event is informed by a fundamental act of prehension of its immediate past 
and is to a certain extent determined by that act. The temporal relations are constituted in this way. 
Similar  to  the  Monadology  of  Leibniz,  the  spatial  relations  are  also  constituted  by  being 
“prehended” from the point of view of a particular actual entity. In addition, proto-mental properties 
are needed to explain the receptivity by which simpler events are enabled to bind into a higher-level 
more complex events. I cannot give an elaborated account of this ontology here.20 One key intuition, 
however,  needs  mentioning:  a  process  ontology  that  works  with  physicalistically  conceived 
fundamental events collapses ultimately into a kind of atomism of those events. Higher-level events 
are mere conglomerates of these.  This criticism of process ontology was prominently raised in 
theology by Pannenberg, who saw process ontology as a strictly atomistic philosophy of nature.21 
But this account is inadequate. How can the relations that enable the combination and unification of 
several fundamental events be grounded in the intrinsic nature of these events? Unity in space and 
time at a level higher than the most basic events becomes possible only if somehow the intrinsic  
properties  of  the  basic  events  ground  those  relations.  In  Leibniz’s  metaphysics,  all  external-
relational properties (“denominations”) are grounded in intrinsic properties (or denominations). The 
best candidates for such absolutely intrinsic properties are those which somehow make possible a 
mental or proto-mental representation of the environment. Leibniz’s account thus results in a kind 
of pan-experientialism, in which each monad is a “living mirror” which represents the universe 
from a perspective. This representation is not merely a passive mirroring but is actively involved in 
the constitution of the universe. It is not surprising that event ontologies, from Whitehead’s classic 
account to Rosenberg’s more recent one, emphasize the mental as fundamental rather than as high-
level  structure  emerging  from an  entirely  non-experiential  “Cartesian”  matter.22 The  Cartesian 
19 Whitehead, Process, p. 236. 
20 For a more detailed account see ch. 8 of my Das Leib-Seele-Problem (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2008) and in English 
my “Natural Individuals and Intrinsic Properties”, Ludger Honnefelder, Edmund Runggaldier, and Benedikt Schick 
(eds), Unity and Time as Problem in Metaphysics (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), pp. 237–52. 
21 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theologie und Philosophie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1996), pp. 353. 
22 Gregg Rosenberg, A Place for Consciousness. Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004). see also William Seager, “Rosenberg, Reducibility, and Consciousness”, Psyche, 12 (2006): 
pp. 1–15.
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“bifurcation”  of  completely  mindless  matter  and  a  purely  mental  soul  is  but  a  conceptual 
abstraction.  Contemporary  debates  on  the  possibility  of  resurrection  are  occurring  within  this 
Cartesian framework. Classical Christian philosophy, at least in its Aristotelian version, emphasized 
the unity of different substances, one of which is material and the other non-material. The ontology 
developed in this paper is in many respects close to this “compound dualism”. It denies, however, 
the Aristotelian/Thomistic thesis that it is only substantial forms, enduring and somehow untouched 
by change, that secure the identity through time of the material beings that are configured by these 
forms. This account fails to capture the materiality and the temporality of natural existence. The 
entire metaphysical “work” of identifying a substance is being done by an Aristotelian “form”, 
something which, in virtue of its abstract nature, is not really a temporal entity.23 We are, as Brian 
Leftow has put it eloquently, “souls dipped in dust”.24 Hylomorphism is thus not really a compound 
dualism, since the counterpart of forms is mere prime matter. The view advocated here regards us 
not  as  souls  dipped in  dust  but  as  processes  made from material  with proto-mental  properties, 
“made  from  mind-dust”,  in  William  James’s  words.  The  thought  that  mental  or  proto-mental 
properties can be found at a level less complex than the level of animals strikes one initially as 
strange. It is, however, an idea with a venerable history in philosophy.25 The prima facie strangeness 
is caused by the intuition that, if this idea is correct, then even very simple entities would have 
mental  states  that  are  relevantly  similar  to  human  mentality.  But  this  is  a  misunderstanding. 
similarity is  not  a  transitive  relation.  Between the  lowest,  least  complex and the  highest,  most 
complex  levels  there  are  many intermediate  levels.  With  regard  to  its  mental  or  proto-mental 
properties each level is similar to its neighboring levels but not necessarily similar to levels that are 
more distant. Because similarity is not transitive, it is possible that ontological levels that are far 
removed from each other are no longer similar with regard to their mental properties.26 This critique 
of  the  Cartesian  bifurcation  is  aimed  at  the  very  notion  of  mere  Cartesian  matter,  and  in 
consequence allows for a metaphysical picture of the human person as a genuine psycho-physical 
unity. Only as such can a human person survive. Instead of a dualism we have here a bipolarism 
such that each concrete individual has both physical and mental properties. The notion of a clear-cut 
duality of the mental and the physical is the product of an abstraction. If one takes that abstraction 
to be ultimately real, one commits what Whitehead terms a “fallacy of misplaced concreteness”. 
It was Russell, among others, who argued that physics captures only those relational and formal 
properties of matter which can be expressed mathematically. Everything we know of the intrinsic 
properties of matter is derived from our experience of mental properties.27 Without delving deeply 
into this metaphysical issue, a point must be emphasized which is salient in the context of this  
paper. It does not suffice, according to this metaphysics, for a concrete particular to be a temporally 
stable configurational pattern in space. A mere aggregate like a cloud formation or a wave is such a 
stable configuration. A true individual represents the world from a perspective. It has its unity not 
only by the stability of its spatial configuration but primarily by the uniqueness of its perspective on 
reality as a whole. This is a highly relevant feature of a theory of survival in a process-ontological 
context.  Survival  means  primarily  the  persistence  of  a  certain  perspective  on  the  world.  The 
question  is,  however,  whether  a  broadly  Whiteheadian  process  ontology  has  the  conceptual 
23 For a critical evaluation of compound dualism see Brüntrup, “Soul, Body and Survival”, pp. 317–35. 
24 “Because what there is to the body if it is abstracted from the soul - prime matter - hasn’t the stature to be a partner 
in any sort of dualism. It cannot even exist on its own.” see Brian Leftow, “Souls dipped in dust”, in K. Corcoran 
(ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival, pp. 120–38, 137f. 
25 David Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). 
26 See also Brüntrup, “Is psycho–physical emergentism committed to dualism? the Causal Efficacy of Emergent 
Mental Properties”, Erkenntnis, 6 (1998): pp. 1–19. 
27 Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Matter (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 270, pp. 402. 
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resources to explicate the possibility of survival as the persistence of a perspective. 
Survival in Process Ontology 
What constitutes a human person on this process-ontological account? A person is a being that can 
relate to itself as itself, which has a reflective self-relation. Human persons are distinguished from 
other higher-level animals by the fact that they are endowed with a first-person perspective, the 
ability to distinguish between themselves as seen from the third person perspective and as seen 
reflectively from their own perspective. Linguistically this capability is displayed by the use of 
pronouns like “I” which the person uses to refer to herself. Persons are able to attribute thoughts to 
themselves as their own thoughts and to reflect on them as such. They thus have self-consciousness, 
not simply phenomenal consciousness. In process-ontological terms the human person is not a 3d-
substance but,  diachronically,  a series of momentary events featuring both mental and physical 
properties.  Synchronically,  this  is  a  hierarchical  ordering  of  higher-level  events  constituted  by 
lower-level events, where a person’s stream of consciousness is located at the highest level. At 
lower levels are entities ranging from biological cells all the way down to elementary particles.  
Only present  events  exist  actually;  these are  partly determined by their  immediate  past,  which 
leaves, before ceasing to exist, a mark on the next event. The structural similarity (common form) 
and the causal connection (genetic relatedness) of the events enable us to speak of a process that 
endures through time. there is, of course, no numerical identity between the events so connected,  
only genidentity in the sense given above. The classical notion of a 3d-substance has thus been 
completely abolished.  Within  the presentist  metaphysics  of  time the 3d-view cannot  simply be 
replaced by a 4d-view on which a four-dimensional wormlike entity is extended through space-
time.  Each personal  event  which grows organically from the past  is  thus a re-enactment  of  its 
predecessor, without being fully determined by it and thus allowing for the possibility of creative 
novelty.  In  spite  of  this  close  genetic  relatedness  of  the  events,  the  person  seems  to  become 
something transient that exists for a moment only to cease to exist in the next moment, a process of 
mere becoming. The concept of a person identical through time, which has dominated Western 
metaphysics, seems to have been given up entirely. A victory for Heraclitus? In our biblical quote 
“Abide with me; fast falls the eventide”, the second half of radical becoming would be eliminating 
the first  of permanence. In this  case nothing would have been gained in comparison to a stage 
version of the 4d-view. The stages, however, would be momentary and thus very short. In any case, 
my prior stages would actually be temporal counterparts of me. A true unity of the person could 
only be conceived by adopting a worm-view instead of the stage-view. But this requires abandoning 
presentism,  since  the  worm exists  in  a  way that  attributes  no  special  ontological  status  to  the 
present.28 The situation seems hopeless. The abandonment of the classical notion of a substance 
seems to imply that everything dissolves in a constant flux. Is there middle ground between these 
alternatives?
Abstraction and Permanence 
Whitehead famously remarked that “to be an abstraction does not mean that an entity is nothing. It 
merely means that its existence is only a factor of a more concrete element of nature.”29 With that in 
28 See Theodore Sider, Four-Dimensionalism. An Ontology of Persistence and Time (Oxford: Clarendon, 2003). 
29 Alfred N. Whitehead, The Concept of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920), p. 171. 
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mind, let us return briefly to Whitehead’s idea that it is a common form of serially ordered events 
that allows for the recognition of an enduring object. Whitehead writes that the form is a complex 
eternal object.30 Eternal objects in Whitehead’s terminology are abstract entities. If eternal objects 
have structuring “impact” in the world by some kind of formal causation, then we have arrived 
again  at  a  Hylomorphic  aristotelian  view.  There  would  be  something  like  a  timeless  forma 
substantialis which constitutes an enduring 3d-object. If this substantial form were doing all or most 
of the metaphysical work in the individuation of a concrete particular, a substance ontology would 
be re-established. This is, of course, incompatible with process metaphysics. In what follows the 
ontological status of those abstract objects or forms will thus be “downgraded” to a non-primary or 
derivative status. The ontological primacy remains with the actual events. For this purpose it is 
essential  to  clarify  what  is  meant  by  “abstract”.  Typically,  abstract  entities  can  be  realized  at 
different places and at different times. Concrete particulars, which we might call “continuants” to 
avoid the loaded notion “substance”, can also exist at different points in time but not simultaneously 
at  different  points  in  space.  One  and  the  same  person  can  exist  in  2005  and  2010  but  not 
simultaneously at two locations in space. Continuants are thus similar to universals with respect to 
multiple temporal and non-simultaneous spatial realizability.31 Following a tradition that reaches 
from the neo-Platonists to Leibniz, Whitehead assumes that all basic entities are concrete entities. 
abstract entities are not self-grounded; their existence depends on the activity of thinking performed 
by concrete entities. This position that is located between realism and nominalism is often called 
conceptualism.  But  if,  in  the  tradition  of  neoplatonism,  it  is  the  divine  mind  that  secures  the 
existence  of  abstract  objects,  one  might  as  well  speak  of  a  realist  position.  As  noted  earlier, 
continuants are indeed similar to universals in that they are able to be instantiated at different times. 
If abstract entities are conceived as entia rationis, entities that are dependent on thinking concrete 
entities, then a middle ground between a pure 4d- and a pure 3d-view is indeed possible. At this 
point one can refer to the abovementioned thesis by Nicholas Rescher: process philosophers are 
realists with regard to processes and idealists with regard to substances.32 In the following we will 
build on this basic intuition. 
In the process-ontological account presented here, we saw that momentary events are related by 
genidentity if they are connected in the right way. Two conditions must be met: causal dependence 
and common form. We could speak of “immanent causation”. What is relevant here is the common 
form as a multiply realizable abstract entity. Entities connected by the relation of genidentity share 
this common form. The abstract entities remain unchanged through the unfolding process. They are 
invariants  of  the  genidentity  relations.  Abstract  entities  are  assumed  to  be  ontologically  mind-
dependent. The analysis of the process of abstraction will then tell us more about the exact nature of 
these  entities.  For  the  time  being  it  suffices  to  analyze  abstraction  in  the  human  mind,  thus 
sidelining the difficult issue of abstract entities dependent on the mind of God. The classic view of 
abstraction as a filtering of common characteristics in a multitude of similar cases was replaced in 
more recent philosophy by a conception that can be traced back to Frege. In his “Grundlagen der 
Arithmetik” Frege noted that many of the singular terms referring to abstract entities derive from 
functional  expressions.  We  speak  of  the  “number  of  objects”,  and  the  “direction  of  objects”. 
“number  of”  and  “direction  of”  are  incomplete  (“ungesättigte”),  functional  expressions.33 The 
genuine discovery by Frege was that, typically for functional expressions that single out abstract 
30 Whitehead, Process, p. 34. 
31 See Peter Simons and Joseph Melia, “Continuants and Occurents”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,  
Supplementary Volumes 74 (2000): pp. 59–92. 
32 See Rescher, pp. 58f. 
33 Gottlob Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der  
Zahl (Breslau: Wilhelm Koebner, 1884), here in particular §62ff. 
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objects, there are equations of the following structure:
f(a) = f(b), iff a r b, 
where r is an equivalence relation. 
To use Frege’s example:
the direction of a = the direction of b, iff a is parallel to b. 
the number of Fs = the number of Gs, iff there are just as many Fs as Gs.34 
The  meaning  of  “number”  is  determined  by  the  equivalence  relation  “just  as  many”  or 
“equinumerous”. Frege merely hinted at this theory of abstraction, and only recently has it been 
more  fully  developed  by  crispin  Wright  and  Bob  Hale.35 Because  equivalence  relations  are 
reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive, they can be used to introduce continuants that preserve their 
identity through time. But we are dealing with a theory of abstraction. continuants become abstracta 
in a very specific  sense.  Peter Simons makes use of this  Fregean intuition when he introduces 
continuants in his ontology, which is basically a 4d-account that does not recognize 3d-substances.36 
It might be useful to clarify the basic idea a little more. Take a number of objects over which an 
equivalence relation has been defined, say, an equivalence relation with regard to their mass. It may 
be called “equi-massive”. Then reformulate using Frege’s analysis. But this time we begin with the 
equivalence relation:
“a is equi-massive to b” 
can be conceptually transformed into 
“the mass of a = the mass of b”.
Thus, the abstract idea of mass has been introduced, and the term “mass” refers to it. Now let’s 
apply this procedure in the context of this paper. Let’s call entities that are endowed with a mental 
or proto-mental perspective on the world “perspectival”. We define an equivalence relation over the 
set of entities that are perspectival: 
“a is equi-perspectival to b” 
can be conceptually transformed into: 
“the perspective of a = the perspective of b”. 
This can be done for first-person perspectives as well: 
“a is first-person-equi-perspectival to b” 
can be conceptually transformed into: 
“the first-person perspective of a = the first-person perspective of b”. 
So far we have been working within the framework of the theory of abstraction developed by Frege, 
Hale, and Wright. In the context of personal identity through time this account needs to be expanded 
because a and b exist at different points in time: 
34 See the excellent presentation of this topic in: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/. 
35 See, for instance, Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, “The Meta-Ontology of Abstraction”, in David Chalmers et al. 
(eds), Metametaphysics. New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (Oxford: Clarendon 2009), pp. 178–212. 
36 See Simons, “The Thread of Persistence”.
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“the first-person perspective of a at t1 = the first-person perspective of b at t2 ” 
can be conceptually transformed into: 
“the first-person perspective of a at t1 = the first-person perspective of b at t2”. 
The first-person perspective is the identity criterion for persons. Two persons are identical if they 
have identical first person perspectives on the world (such that they are able to use the personal 
pronoun “I” to refer to themselves). One thus arrives finally at: 
“the person at t1 = the person at t2”.
Personal Identity 
What has been developed above is - in a nutshell - a theory of personal identity. The most striking 
feature is that, according to this account, the concept “person” refers to an abstract object that was 
introduced by an equivalence relation. The question that immediately comes to mind is this: how 
can two events featuring a perspective considered to be equi-perspectival? Identity of perspective 
must not be used to ascribe the relation of being equi-perspectival,  because that would entail  a 
vicious circle. The abstract notion of a perspective ought to be derived. The equivalence relations 
must  thus  be  introduced  independently  of  the  abstract  entities  that  will  be  derived  by  these 
equivalence  relations.  This  is  where  process  ontology  developed  above  helps  fill  the  gaps.  A 
suitable equivalence relation stands in need of certain stable patterns and the appropriate causal 
connection. 
Because these two elements are sufficient for establishing genidentity, they are also sufficient to 
establish  equivalence  relations.  The  “Thread  of  Persistence”  between  the  events  in  a  temporal 
sequence is  genidentity.  Genidentity,  as  Whitehead points  out,37 rests  on the  appropriate  causal 
connection and a common element of form. The thread of immanent causation thus established 
allows for a multitude of momentary events to be joined into an enduring, stable process. But the  
process is not yet a 3d-object; it is a stable and rhythmic repetition of similar events. The 3d-object, 
according to the key claim, does not exist independently of the mental abstraction that works with 
equivalence  relations.  It  is  an  ens  rationis.  A thinking  mind  can  make  use  of  the  equivalence 
relations that are based on causal relations and common forms, this is a mental process that results 
via abstraction in a 3d-continuant. Continuants are abstract objects which can be realized at several 
points in time and non-simultaneously at several spatial locations. They are well-founded in the 
reality of the appropriately related events. It is thus by our mental activity that we introduce into the 
world the stability that withstands the eroding power of the Heraclitean flux. This account does 
indeed imply a sort of Berkeleyan idealism with regard to 3d-substances. Their being is partially a 
“being  conceived”  as  continuant.  To the  question  that  was  raised  against  Berkeley as  to  what 
happens with them if nobody is thinking of them, the theists among the process metaphysicians 
might well answer just like Berkeley: God secures their existence with his omnipresent mind. One 
could, however, bite the bullet and grant that there are no 3d-substances in the world that exist 
independently of the human mind. The introduction of substances might then be conceived as the 
“original sin” of Western metaphysics.38
Taking  stock:  Rescher’s  claim  that  process  philosophers  tend  to  be  idealists  with  regard  to 
37 Whitehead, Process, p. 34. 
38 This view has been advanced recently by Lorenz B. Puntel, Structure and Being (University Park, Pa: Penn State 
University Press, 2008). 
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substances was spelled out by drawing on a theory of abstraction originally introduced by Frege. 
The result was an abstractionist view of 3d-continuants. Continuants without temporal parts are thus 
abstractions that we introduce in order to structure our physical environment and possibly even 
more so our social environment. Their introduction is not arbitrary but is founded in the causal 
relations among events that generate stable patterns through uniform repetition. This relatedness is 
strong enough that  we may speak of genidentity and immanent causation.  Sentences about  3d-
substances that are thus ontologically committed to the existence of continuants are not strictly 
speaking false. In the same way, talk about centers of gravity is not false in physics, even though 
centers of gravity are abstractions that do not exist strictly speaking. The continuant is not, however, 
simply identical to a sequence of momentary events which constitutes its life. That would amount to 
a pure 4d-view. It seems that the 3.5d-view suggested here can prove more fruitful than a 4d-view 
for understanding our social practices. The 4D-view entirely drops the notoriously difficult notion 
of a substance and settles instead for a sequence of time slices or stages that are connected in the  
appropriate  way.  The  account  suggested  here  can  introduce  ontologically  well-founded  3d-
continuants  over  and above the  4d-base  introduced by abstraction.  They are  thus  ontologically 
dependent on minds and as such differ from classically construed 3d-substances. It is this position 
between the two well-established camps of 3-dimensionalism and 4-dimensionalism that justifies 
the talk of the 3.5-dimensionalism featuring as the somewhat provocative title of this paper. One 
advantage of this view is that it does not require dropping, and in fact provides good reason to 
maintain, our common-sense 3d-metaphysics. It is a practical necessity to introduce time-invariant 
fixed points in our common-sense world view. 
The classical notion of a substance serves this purpose. A revisionist metaphysics implying that 
there  are  no  entire  persons  as  such  but  only time-slices  of  persons  or  person stages  is  hardly 
sustainable  in  a  life  lived  according  to  customary social  standards.  On  the  abstractionist  view 
advocated here,  however,  the continuants are fully present at  each passing moment.  They are a 
special kind of abstract entity and can thus be present at different times and different places (non-
simultaneously). In the case of personal identity this is of the utmost importance. A single first-
person perspective cannot be shared by two events which exist at different spatial locations. The 
most difficult issue arises, however, when one contemplates the possibility of fission. What happens 
if two or more spatially separated personal events are connected in the right way to a sequence of  
earlier personal events? this is a deep puzzle that cannot easily be solved within a metaphysical 
account that assumes a 4d-view at the most basic level. Seen from point of view of the persons 
existing after the fission, several continuants overlap in the past. This is admittedly problematic. In 
this respect the 3.5d-view does better than the traditional 4d-view, because the continuants are entia 
rationis and thus mind-dependent. From each point of view, there is thus indeed only one person in 
the past, and there is no deeper mind-independent level of overlap. 
Surviving Natural Death 
The question that prompted this paper was whether abandoning the classical notion of a substance 
would render the religious notion of possibly surviving one’s natural death unintelligible. With the 
metaphysical framework of process ontology now in place, it will now be shown that this religious 
hope can indeed be explicated without the reference to the notion of 3d-substances. In an ontology 
of radical becoming, death loses something of its uniqueness. As demonstrated above, dying is 
happening constantly in the transition from one momentary event to the next. The fact that we are 
not worried by this fact is grounded in the experience that in natural life each experienced moment 
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seems to have an immediate successor which is connected to the earlier one in a way appropriate for 
establishing genidentity.  The concept of genidentity is associated with the concept of immanent 
causation. The general idea is that a stage s1 of a concrete particular e generates or brings about a 
later stage s2 of  e itself.  In the case of persons: a human person P which exists at  a time t3 is 
genidentical  to  a  human  person  which  exists  at  t1 if  the  temporal  stages  that  lead  to  t3 are 
immanently causally connected with the temporal stage of P at t1. This is the case in our daily 
experience. The events do have the causal power to bring about their immediate successors. The 
stream of consciousness which makes our first-person perspective a phenomenal experience, is just 
this sort of chain of serially ordered events. this is a process which, under normal circumstances, 
self-perpetuates during the span of a human natural life.39 In the moment of death this causal chain 
ends abruptly. A subsequent moment of phenomenal experience from the first-person perspective 
cannot be brought about by the earlier events. Natural life comes to an end. In these circumstances, 
it seems impossible to survive one’s natural death. The dying organism lacks the causal powers to 
generate a subsequent state that would be able to secure the survival of the first-person perspective. 
From a Christian point of view this  metaphysical  analysis  hardly comes as a surprise,  because 
human beings are not naturally equipped to survive their natural death. A divine action is needed. 
The earthly human existence, according to the metaphysical account presented here, is a series of 
momentary psycho-physical events which are complex enough to sustain a first-person perspective. 
If God wanted to secure my survival, it would suffice that He created a successor event such that it  
was connected with the last momentary stage of my earthly existence in the appropriate way. In 
light of what was developed above this means, first, stability of structure, that is, the endurance of a 
common form. God would have to create an event that was in relevant aspects sufficiently similar to 
my earthly existence. The successor must be a human person and not some kind of wildly different 
being. Most importantly then, the successor must be endowed with a first-person perspective. But 
one  can  only  reasonably  assume  that  this  perspective  endures  if  there  is  an  immanent  causal 
connection bridging the gap, that is, if there is such a connection between my final earthly event and 
the first event of my afterlife. Only when genidentity is established can numerical identity through 
time be established,  and the latter  is  established by an act  of abstraction using the appropriate 
equivalence relations. But this is precisely what seems to be impossible. My last earthly event lacks 
the causal power to bring about all by itself the first event in the afterlife. Here divine concurrence  
is required. But if the causal chain runs “through” God, then we can no longer speak of immanent 
causation; we would rather have to admit that an external force is doing the work. Genidentity is  
thus not preserved. At this point the relevance of recent debates on the compatibility of materialism 
and survival becomes obvious. Dean Zimmerman has pursued the question whether, in the case of a  
newly created body in the afterlife, immanent causation could be preserved, even though the causal 
chain is mediated by God.40 This depends, obviously, on the notion of immanent causation that is 
being  applied,  especially  which  kind  of  determinants  are  admissible.  If  God’s  intervention  is 
causally  necessary  but  not  causally  sufficient  to  bring  about  the  person  in  the  afterlife,  then 
immanent causation might be preserved. Assume God wills and realizes by divine decree: Let there 
be a person whose first-person perspective on the world is exactly like the one of the person who 
has just died. In this case God would be necessary for bringing about the successor, but He would  
not be causally sufficient. The reason is that God does not directly determine how the first-person 
perspective on the world of the deceased person looks; it is instead determined by the life of the 
person who has died. The “thread of persistence” really runs “through” God in this case. 
39 I am neglecting the question whether there are other causal determinants. There might be an external metaphysical 
force sustaining this process like Whitehead’s creativity or a divine concurrence like a creatio continua. 
40 Zimmerman, “Falling Elevator”, chapter 2 of this volume.
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The obvious and pressing question is now: is the newly created person in the afterlife identical to 
the deceased earthly person? In the line of the argument given above, the answer is affirmative. 
Owing  to  the  immanent  causal  connection  secured  by divine  concurrence  there  is  genidentity 
between the  two personal  events.  And since  from the  first-person perspective  of  the  surviving 
person a 3d-continuant can be abstracted with the relevant equivalence relation (equi-perspectival), 
the surviving person can be conceived as a continuant without temporal parts. In order to do this in 
the most efficient way, it would be helpful if the surviving person had a mental representation of 
his/her entire life experience. In a near-death experience people often have a vivid experience of 
their  temporal  existence  in  a  kind  of  simultaneity that  defies  description.  That  is  probably the 
closest analogy we can get for the experience to integrate the fullness of one’s earthly life into the 
life to come. Complete and radical psychological discontinuity (of memory and character) is hard to 
reconcile with the idea of survival.  Survival means that  the fullness of experience is  somehow 
integrated in and preserved by the life to come. But the continuant is not identical to its life. In that 
respect the view advocated here is different from a 4d-account. By the very process of abstraction 
one disassociates oneself from the mere sequence of events which elapse like a movie made from 
individual  frames,  and  thus  integrates  them  as  experiences  of  one  and  the  same  person  (a 
continuant). The unity of the person is again established by a mental act,  an act of abstraction. 
Subjectivity replaces the old notion of  substance.  Again,  the Berkeleyan problem of  what  then 
remains of the person independently of the human mind might be resolved by taking into account 
mental acts of recognition and individuation by God. 
What happens to bodily resurrection in this process-ontological account? It seems that we end up in 
a position that is relevantly similar to Lynne Baker’s constitution theory, in which the identity of the 
first-person  perspective  is  what  exclusively  ensures  survival.  The  body  does  no  metaphysical 
work.41 In our account, the “thread of persistence” was woven by causal relations and by a common 
element of form. The analysis of the mind-body problem within the framework of process ontology 
repudiated  the  cartesian  “bifurcation”  of  mind  and  body,  defending  instead  a  psycho-physical 
bipolarism. Does this psycho-physical bipolarity belong to the indispensable characteristics of a 
human person that must somehow be preserved as a common element of form in order to ensure 
that  the “thread of persistence” is  not severed? This seems to be the case.  Human persons are 
endowed with senses and thus  experiences that  are  sensual  in  character.  Could a human being 
survive  as  a  spirit  without  any sensual  experience  at  all?  Humans  have  a  clear  conception  of 
“inside” and “outside”, notions that would not make sense to a pure spirit without sense experience 
or something similar. If humans cannot become angelic spirits in the afterlife without ceasing to be 
human persons,  then some kind of  bodily existence needs  to  be preserved.  It  is  not necessary, 
however,  that  the  resurrected  body be  numerically  identical  with  the  biological  body we  now 
possess. It might well be a body of a radically different kind. 
Finally, and in closing, a few remarks on time and eternity. On a presentist metaphysics of time, the 
claim that human persons exist temporally implies that only the present is fully real and given in its 
fullness. The richness of my past exists only inasmuch it is preserved in my present; as such it is no 
longer existent.  No human being experiences my pain of 20 years ago, I may only re-enact its  
experience now. My future experiences are not yet real. It is only the abstract idea of an enduring 
person (without temporal parts) which integrates this process of radical becoming into a true unity. 
A unity which is not simply the agglomeration of all my experiences, but the integral unity that 
makes it possible to speak of each of those experiences as mine, the experiences of an enduring 
subject of experience. As a tribute to our temporal existence, we need the idea of a 3d-substance in 
order to prevent our life from disintegrating into a series of episodes. It is hard to imagine the life to  
41 Lynne Rudder Baker, “Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection”, Religious Studies, 43 (2007), pp. 333–48. 
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come is simply an endless repetitive addition of more and more moments in time. This is a thought  
that many may find hard to bear. Personally, I picture eternal life more like a “filled moment”, an 
eternal “now”. That is just a metaphor, of course, for our imagination is incapable of picturing an 
existence outside of the time known to us. But if this is so, then we will not in the afterlife need the 
abstract idea of an enduring substance without temporal parts which integrates the temporal flux of 
our existence. We need it in this life, so as not to be drowned in the flux of ever new events. If in the 
life to come there is no time that flows in this way, then we can lay the question of substances and  
3D-objects to rest. It is a question that makes sense only in the natural world. It has thus been  
shown that the religious hope of surviving one’s natural death is not necessarily tied to the idea of 
substances  as  conceived  in  classical  metaphysics.  the  idea  of  resurrection  can  be  formulated 
independently of substance metaphysics. 
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